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PREEMPTION OR BUST: A REVIEW OF THE
RECENT TRENDS IN MEDICAID PREEMPTION
ACTIONS
Bradley J. Sayles *
I. INTRODUCTION
As 2009 approached, many states faced astronomical budget deficits.
State legislatures made quick efforts to close the deficit gaps and funds
previously allocated to State Medicaid Programs were often the first and
most trimmed back.' As state deficit problems continued to grow, Congress
took action by passing the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(ARRA), which President Barack Obama signed into law on February 17,
2009. One facet of the ARRA is a temporary increase of $87 billion in the
federal share of Medicaid costs.3 However, the increased federal funds
expire on December 31, 2010.4 Consequently, states are predicted to suffer
* Bradley J. Sayles is an associate at the law firm of Barnett, Benvenuti & Butler.
B.S., B.A., M.P.A. Northern Kentucky University, J.D. University of Kentucky. The
author is grateful for the guidance and expertise provided by Wesley R. Butler.
1. See Elizabeth Fernandez, Medi-Cal Cuts Put Pressure on Counties, S.F.
CHRONICLE, Feb. 20, 2009, at A13 (noting that the California budget shifts $54 million
away from county and UC hospitals through reductions in Medicaid); Kevin Sack &
Katie Zezima, Growing Need for Medicaid Strains States, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2009, at
A25 (describing provider payment cuts in Florida, Nevada, California, Minnesota, South
Carolina, Utah, among others); Julie Appleby, States Forced to Cut Health Coverage for
Poor, USA TODAY (Oct. 10, 2008), http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2008-10-28-
health-cuts N.htm (noting Medicaid funding cuts for Hawaii, South Carolina, California
and Massachusetts and quoting Elizabeth McNichol, "Health care gets hit hard when
states have to cut back").
2. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat
115 (2009); KAISER FAMILY FOUND., American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA):
Medicaid and Health Care Provisions (Mar. 2009), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/
7872.pdf.
3. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 2, at 1. In order to receive these increased
funds, the ARRA requires states to maintain certain aspects of their current Medicaid




even larger budget deficits. 5 Absent additional federal support, it is likely
that states will again look to cut Medicaid funding.6
Although beneficiaries suffer the greatest injuries when states trim
Medicaid funds, providers are often the first to suffer the associated financial
consequences. When states reduce funds from their Medicaid programs, the
simplest reduction is often made by decreasing payment rates to those that
provide medical services to Medicaid enrollees.7  Yet, Congress and the
courts have spent the last twenty years stripping providers of any means to
protect themselves against rate reductions that directly conflict with, or
obstruct, the goals and objectives of the Medicaid Act.8 Despite the
previous actions of Congress and the courts, providers may still have at least
one route to the courthouse door: the Supremacy Clause.9
This Article examines how Medicaid providers may use the Supremacy
Clause as a tool to prevent states from arbitrarily reducing Medicaid
reimbursement rates. Part II provides pertinent background information
regarding the Medicaid Act and discusses the history behind 42 U.S.C. §§
1396a(a)(30) and 1983.10 Part III discusses the Supremacy Clause and the
Preemption Doctrine including what establishes federal jurisdiction and the
remedies available to aggrieved parties. Part Ill also discusses the Supreme
Court's decision in Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers ofAmerica
v. Walsh and the lower courts' interpretation of that case. Finally, Part IV
provides analysis of the current state of the law and maintains that providers
should argue that the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services (the Secretary) not be afforded any deference and that providers
assume the burden of production.
5. Elizabeth McNichol & Nicholas Johnson, Recession Continues to Batter State
Budgets; State Responses Could Slow Recovery (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.cbpp.org/
files/9-8-08sfp.pdf.
6. Medicaid's Continuing Crunch In a Recession: A Mid- Year Update for State FY
2010 and Preview for FY 2011, KAISER FAMILY FoUND. 1, 2 (Feb. 2010),
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8049.pdf ("Many governors' proposed budgets for
state fiscal year 2011 include drastic cuts to Medicaid.").
7. See Sack & Zezima, supra note 1, at A25.
8. See infra Part I.B.
9. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396(a)(30) & 1983 (2003).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The MedicaidAct
In 1965, Congress enacted Titles XVIII and XIX to the Social Security
Act." Title XVIII created the Medicare program and Title XIX established
Medicaid.12 Although both Medicaid and Medicare were launched
simultaneously and provide healthcare to specified demographics, the
similarities end there. The purpose of each act reflects the obvious
distinction: Congress designed Medicare to provide hospital insurance for
the aged, while intending Medicaid to enable each state to furnish medical
assistance to low income persons.' 3 The implementation of each program
demonstrates arguably the most significant distinction. Medicare is a
federally administered program, while Medicaid is a cooperative federal-
state program. 14 As a cooperative program, Medicaid gives states a choice
in participating, 5 but includes several incentives that ensure wide-scale
participation.' 6  By 1969, only four years after its enactment, all but two
11. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-96 (2009).
12. Id.
13. See Amgen, Inc. v. Smith, 357 F.3d 103, 110 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("The broad
purpose of the Medicare Act [is] to provide more adequate and feasible health insurance
protection for the elderly."); Newark Parents Ass'n v. Newark Pub. Schs., 547 F.3d 199,
207 (3d Cir. 2008) ("[Medicaid Act] established a cooperative federal-state program
under which the federal government furnishes funding to states for the purpose of
providing medical assistance to eligible low-income persons.").
14. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965)
(codified as amended in subchapter XVIII of 42 U.S.C.); see generally ROBERT STEVENS
& ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A CASE STUDY OF MEDICAID 68
(1974); Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid at Forty: Revisiting Structure and Meaning in a Post-
Deficit Reduction Act Era, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 5 (2006) (for further analysis of
the Medicaid's history).
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a; Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308 (1980).
16. STEVENS& STEVENS, supra note 14, at 61.
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states joined the cooperative program.'7 Since 1982, every state has taken
part in Medicaid.' 8
Once a state agrees to participate in the Medicaid program, it must create
a plan that complies with the provisions of relevant federal statutes and
19 20
regulations (the State Plan)19 and meets the approval of the Secretary.
However, the Secretary does not review the State Plan's payment methods
and standards; instead, approval is based on the assurances made by each
state that the plan meets all federal requirements.21 The Secretary has since
delegated the approval authority to the Regional Administrators of the
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). 22
Health care providers, similar to states, opt-in to the Medicaid program.23
Medicaid providers, in most cases, are paid directly for the services they
provide to eligible beneficiaries. 24 These payments must be accepted as
payment in full.25 Providers, nonetheless, may choose not to participate in
Medicaid, but for many providers, non-participation is not an easy decision.
For example, non-profit hospitals with emergency departments risk not only
the loss of their tax exempt status, but may still be forced to provide care to
26
eligible individuals because of other statutory requirements. These
17. Id.
18. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2901-2998 (1982); ALASKA STAT. § 47.07.010-900
(1972).
19. 42 C.F.R. § 430.15(a)(1) (2009); see also Harris, 448 U.S. at 297; Dep't of
Health Servs. v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 823 F.2d 323, 325 (9th Cir. 1987).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b).
21. 42 C.F.R. § 447.256(2) (2009).
22. Id. at § 430.15(b).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A).
24. 42 C.F.R. § 447.10 (2009).
25. Rehab. Ass'n of Va. v. Kozlowski, 42 F.3d 1444, 1447 (4th Cir. 1994); See 42
C.F.R § 447.15 (2009).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd; see also 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006); Rev. Rul. 69-545,
1969-2 C.B. 117; Daniel M. Fox & Daniel C. Schaffer, Tax Administration as Health
Policy: Hospitals, The Internal Revenue Service and the Courts, 16 J. HEALTH POL.,
PoL'Y & L. 251 (1991); Nancy M. Kane, Tax-Exempt Hospitals: What is Their
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circumstances, combined with the always-rising costs of health care, make
Medicaid reimbursements rates even more significant and create a genuine
dilemma for providers.
B. The Evolution of§§ 1396a(a) (30) and 1983
A State Plan must meet specific requirements expressly provided by
statute in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a. The requirement most pertinent to Medicaid
providers is § 1396a(a)(30). That subsection requires, in part, that State
Plans must:
[p]rovide such methods and procedures relating to the utilization
of, and the payment for, care and services available under the plan
. . . as may be necessary to safeguard against unnecessary
utilization of such care and services and to assure that payments
are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care and
are sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and services
are available under the plan at least to the extent that such care and
services are available to the general population in the geographic
28area.
This provision is often referred to as the "equal access" provision.
Subsection 1396a(a)(30), the central federal limit on payment rates, is the
subject of much litigation. 29
Since the adoption of the Medicaid Act in 1965, the language governing
payments has changed drastically. Until 1997, § 1396a(a)(30) applied
primarily to physicians. 3 0  As adopted, § 1396a(a)(30) required that
Medicaid payments not be "in excess of reasonable charges consistent with
efficiency, economy, and quality of care."31 The 1965 legislation allowed
states to determine what payment schemes to adopt, but required
Charitable Responsibility and How Should it Be Defined and Reported?, 51 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 459 (2007).
27. American Health Care Costs a Primer: Key Information on Health Care Costs
and Their Impact, KAISER FAMILY FOuND. (Mar. 2009), http://www.kff.org/
insurance/upload/7670_02.pdf.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A).
29. See id. at § 1396a; see also infra Parts II-III.
30. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33 (1997).
31. Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491, 1497 (9th Cir. 1997).
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reimbursement of inpatient hospital care for reasonable costs.32 Medicare
also used the term "reasonable costs" and applied the regulations
interpreting the term under that Act to Medicaid. This served to prevent
states from restricting the most expensive form of healthcare, inpatient
hospital care.34  However, all other providers generally received "self-
determined fees."3 As a result, by 1970, providers had become the villains
of the Medicaid story. 36
Despite laying the blame on the provider's doorstep, Congress initially did
not act to reduce reimbursement rates by controlling expenses. Instead, the
federal government, in order to resolve such issues, proposed to cut back on
eligibility and covered services.37 This enabled states to determine whether
reimbursement rates should be cut and some states took such action.38 In
response to state-initiated rate cuts, a few providers sought declaratory and
injunctive relief from the courts, with limited success. 39 In 1972, Congress
began a shift towards more flexible standards for Medicaid. 40 But it was not
until 1980 that Con ress enacted serious changes to the interpretation of
reimbursement rates.
32. Pub. L. No. 89-97 (1965); see also STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 14, at 66
(creating "a Pandora's box for medical costs").
33. STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 14, at 187.
34. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH SERVICES, DHHS, Pub. No. 2009-1232,
Health, United States 2008 with Special Features on Health of Young Adults 4 (2008),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus08.pdf ("Hospital spending ... accounts for 31%
of national health expenditures.").
35. STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 14, at 132.
36. Id. at 183.
37. Id. at 213.
38. Id. at 265-66.
39. See Rhodes v. Harder, 508 P.2d 959, 961 (Kan. 1973); Shady Acres Nursing
Home, Inc. v. Canary, 316 N.E.2d 481, 483-84 (Ohio App. 1973); Catholic Med. Ctr. of
Brooklyn & Queens, Inc., v. Rockefeller, 430 F.2d 1297, 1298-99 (2d Cir. 1970).
40. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603 (1972).
41. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499 (1980).
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The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980 enacted the Boren Amendment,
which required states to make "reasonable and adequate" payments to meet
42the costs incurred by "efficiently and economically" run nursing facilities.
Congress intended that this provision would prevent states from reducing
rates "solely on the basis of budgetary appropriations." 43 However, this
"Congressional admonition must be taken with a grain of salt since the
subsequent federal [Medicaid funding] cutbacks obviously had an impact on
a state's financial health, a factor Congress could not have ignored."" A
year later, with the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981, Congress removed
the "in excess of reasonable charges" language from § 1396a(a)(30) and
extended the Boren Amendment to cover payments for inpatient hospital
care.4 5 The legislative history behind the 1981 extension is more telling,
stating:
In eliminating the current requirement that States pay hospitals on
a Medicare "reasonable cost" basis for inpatient services under
Medicaid, the Committee recognizes the inflationary nature of the
current cost reimbursement system and intends to give States
greater latitude in developing and implementing alternative
reimbursement methodologies that 4Fromote the efficient and
economical delivery of such services.
Despite Congressional intent, the Boren Amendment became a staple in
provider litigation, due in large part to Supreme Court decisions broadly
interpreting § 1983.47
Enacted in 1871 under the Klu Klux Klan Act, § 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
42. Id.
43. Miss. Hosp. Ass'n, v. Heckler, 701 F.2d 511, 518 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing H.R.
Conf. Rep. 1479, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 154, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5526,
5903, 5944).
44. Coal. of Mich. Nursing Homes, Inc. v. Dempsey, 537 F. Supp. 451, 463 n. 41
(E.D. Mich. 1982).
45. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357
(1981).
46. H.R. Rep. No. 158, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., at 293 (1981).
47. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
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person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.48
In 1980, the year Congress adopted the Boren Amendment and over 100
years after the enactment of § 1983, the Supreme Court decided Maine v.
Thiboutot, which held for the first time that § 1983's "and laws" language
included federal statutes. 49 The result in Thiboutot established a cause of
action under § 1983 for state deprivations of "rights secured" by federal
statutes, not just constitutional rights.50 The following year, in Pennhurst
State School and Hospital v. Halderman, the Supreme Court first chipped
away at Thiboutot's broad holding.5'
In Pennhurst, the Supreme Court held that language contained within the
"bill of rights" provision of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and
Bill of Rights Act "spoke merely in precatory terms" and did not confer any
"substantive rights." 2 Without a "substantive right" to enforce, § 1983 is
useless to a claimant. After Pennhurst, the focus under § 1983 actions
became whether the statute itself contained mandatory, not merely precatory,
right-conferring language. 54 Following Pennhurst, the Supreme Court, in
Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, further defined § 1983 actions.55
The result was a three-part test:
(1) Whether the provision in question creates obligations binding
on the governmental unit or rather 'does no more than express a
congressional preference for certain kinds of treatment.' (2) The
interest the plaintiff asserts must not be 'too vague and
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).
49. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4-5; See Paul Wartelle & Jeffrey Hadley Louden, Private
Enforcement of Federal Statutes: The Role of the Section 1983 Remedy, 9 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 487 (1982) (discussing the Thiboutot decision).
50. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 18.
53. Id. at 28 n. 21.
54. Lynch v. King, 550 F. Supp. 325, 349 (D.C. Mass. 1982).
55. 493 U.S. 103 (1989).
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amorphous' to be 'beyond the competence of the judiciary to
enforce.' (3) We have also asked whether the provision in question
'was intend[ed] to benefit' the putative plaintiff. 56
Section 1983 claims, of course, became more prevalent following
Thiboutot and Pennhurst. Specifically, Medicaid providers used § 1983 to
enforce the newly enacted Boren Amendment. As a result, the federal
circuit courts struggled with the application of the Boren Amendment and §
1983 for close to a decade. But, a year after the Golden State decision, the
Supreme Court was presented with the opportunity to measure the Boren
Amendment against its § 1983 three-part test. In Wilder v. Virginia
Hospital Association, the Supreme Court held that the Boren Amendment
"creates a right enforceable by health care providers under § 1983."" The
story, however, does not end here; Congress was not done with the Medicaid
Act and the Supreme Court was far from done with § 1983.
56. Id. at 106 (citations omitted).
57. See, e.g., W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 30 (3d Cir.
1989) (holding the Pennsylvania reimbursement scheme violated the Boren
Amendment), cert. denied, 46 U.S. 936 (1990); Colo. Health Care Ass'n v. Colo. Dep't
of Soc. Servs., 842 F.2d 1158, 1164 n.5 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that providers could
assert the rights of Medicaid recipients); Silver v. Baggiano, 804 F.2d 1211, 1218 (1 1th
Cir. 1986) (expressly reserving the question); Coos Bay Care Ctr. v. State of Oregon, 803
F.2d 1060, 1061 (9th Cir. 1986), vacated on other grounds, 484 U.S. 806 (1987); Neb.
Health Care Ass'n v. Dunning, 778 F.2d 1291, 1296 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1063 (1987); Folden v. Wash. State DSHS, 744 F. Supp. 1507, 1525 (W.D. Wash.
1990) (dismissing the plaintiffs' § 1983 claims, but finding a cause of action directly
under the Boren Amendment and reviewing that claim under an arbitrary and capricious
standard); Mich. Hosp. Ass'n v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 738 F. Supp. 1080, 1085-86 (W.D.
Mich. 1990); Ill. Health Care Ass'n v. Suter, 719 F. Supp. 1419, 1427 (N.D. IIl. 1989)
(holding that no private cause of action to sue the Secretary exists under the Boren
Amendment); St. Michael Hosp. v. Thompson, 725 F. Supp. 1038, 1043-44 (W.D. Wis.
1989) (holding that a private right of action exists under the Boren Amendment but, for
other reasons, refusing to decide the merits of the case); AGI-Bluff Manor, Inc. v.
Reagen, 713 F. Supp. 1535, 1542 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (finding no § 1983 right of action
under the Boren Amendment); Coal. of Mich. Nursing Homes, Inc. v. Dempsey, 537 F.
Supp. 451, 452 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (asserting an implied right of action under the Boren
Amendment rather than § 1983).
58. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 501 (1990).
59. Id. at 509-10.
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With the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Congress repealed the Boren
Amendment. 60 This left § 1396a(a)(30), the "equal access" provision, as the
primary federal guideline for state reimbursement rates. Repeal of the Boren
Amendment removed the "reasonable" payment rate requirements and put
the Supreme Court's holding in Wilder in question. Although, Wilder is still
considered "good" law,61 its applicability to Medicaid is questionable
because of the Boren Amendment's repeal and the Supreme Court's
propensity to continually tinker with § 1983 claims.
The Supreme Court has made two primary adjustments to the three-part
test laid out in Golden State and as applied in Wilder. First, in Blessing v.
Freestone the Court reorganized and more succinctly stated the test:
Three principal factors determine whether a statutory provision
creates a privately enforceable right [under § 1983]: (1) whether
the plaintiff is an intended beneficiary of the statute; (2) whether
the plaintiff's asserted interests are not so vague and amorphous as
to be beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce; and (3)
whether the statute imposes a binding obligation on the State.62
After applying the reworked three-part test, the Court found that the
Spending Clause legislation at issue did not provide rights under § 1983.
The second, and most important, adjustment came in the 2002 decision of
Gonzaga University v. Doe, in which the Supreme Court also disallowed a §
1983 claim brought under Spending Clause legislation.63 In doing so, the
Court emphasized that "unless Congress 'speak[s] with a clear voice' and
manifests an 'unambiguous' intent to confer individual rights, federal
funding provisions provide no basis for private enforcement by § 1983."64
Circuit courts have since struggled with the meaning of Gonzaga, but its
application to Medicaid provider appeals has been universally harsh.
60. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33 (1997).
61. See Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Ark. Dept. of Human Servs., 443 F.3d 1005,
1015 (8th Cir. 2006); Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 184 (3rd Cir.
2004); see also Rochell Bobroff, Section 1983 and Preemption: Alternative Means of
Court Access for Safety Net Statutes, 10 Loy. J. PuB. INT. L. 27, 85 (2008).
62. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 329-30 (1997).
63. Gonzaga v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 290 (2002); see also Sasha Samberg-Champion,
How to Read Gonzaga: Laying the Seeds of a Coherent Section 1983 Jurisprudence, 103
COLUM. L. REv. 1838, 1840 (2003) (noting that "some analysts conclude that Gonzaga
signals the end of Section 1983 actions to enforce at least all Spending Clause statutes.").
64. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 280 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,
451 U.S. 1, 17, 28 n.21 (1981)).
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Prior to Gonzaga, but after Blessing and the Boren Amendment's repeal,
federal circuit courts split regarding whether providers are the intended
beneficiaries of the equal access provision.65 Post-Gonzaga, there remains a
split among the federal circuits as to whether Congress intended the equal
access provision to confer individual rights upon eligible beneficiaries.66 As
applied to providers, however, each court, when confronted with the issue,
found that providers are not conferred rights under § 1396a(a)(30).6 ' The
Supreme Court has yet to take any interest in hearing appeals based on these
decisions, and without further guidance from the Supreme Court, § 1983
remains closed to providers.
But not all is lost. Many providers have recently used the Supremacy
Clause's preemption doctrine to hold states accountable for reimbursement
65. See e.g., Pa. Pharmacists Ass'n v. Houstoun, 283 F.3d 531, 543-44 (3d Cir.
2002) (en banc) (positing, in dicta, a right for recipients while rejecting such a right for
providers); Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc. v. Hood, 235 F.3d 908, 910 (5th Cir.
2000); Visiting Nurse Ass'n of North Shore v. Bullen, 93 F.3d 997, 1004 n.7 (1st Cir.
1996) (holding a right existed for providers and beneficiaries); Methodist Hosps., Inc. v.
Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1029 (7th Cir. 1996); Ark. Med. Soc'y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d
519, 528 (8th Cir. 1993).
66. See Equal Access for El Paso v. Hawkins, 509 F.3d 697, 704 (5th Cir. 2007)
(holding that § 1396a(a)(30), does not confer individual private rights that are
enforceable under § 1983); Mandy v. Owens, 464 F.3d 1139, 1148 (10th Cir. 2006)
(holding § 1396a(a)(30) does not create a federal right enforceable under § 1983);
Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 542-43 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that §
1396a(a)(30) "has an aggregate focus rather than an individual focus" and is "ill-suited to
judicial remedy;" therefore, no § 1983 right of action for providers or
beneficiaries); Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding there is
no enforceable private right for recipients or providers); Long Term Pharmacy Alliance
v. Ferguson, 362 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding no enforceable private right for
providers because § 1396a(a)(30) "has no 'rights creating language' and identifies no
discrete class of beneficiaries"); but see Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Ark. Dep't of
Human Servs., 443 F.3d 1005, 1015-16 (8th Cir. 2006) (following prior circuit precedent
that § 1396a(a)(30) created an enforceable private right for recipients and providers,
despite Gonzaga), judgment vacated, Selig v. Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc., 551 U.S.
1142, 1142 (2007) (instructing the lower court to dismiss the appeal as moot).
67. See sources cited supra note 66.
68. See e.g. Hawkins, 129 S. Ct. at 34; but see Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre Love
Triangle: The Spending Clause, Section 1983, and Medicaid Entitlements, 42 U.C. DAVIS
L. REv. 413, 469-70 (2009) (suggesting that Gonzaga is ripe for reconsideration, but
revisiting Gonzaga may result in an elimination of private causes of actions altogether).
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rate reductions. 69 Although the Supremacy Clause is a road back to the
courthouse door, it is a journey yet to be completed.
Ill. SUPREMACY CLAUSE AND THE DOCTRINE OF PREEMPTION
A. The Supremacy Clause in General; Preemption, Jurisdiction and
Remedies
The Supremacy Clause is the dividing line between the shared sovereignty
of the federal and state governments. As the Supreme Court asserted, "the
States possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Government,
subject only to limitations imposed by the Supremacy Clause." 70  In
pertinent part, the Supremacy Clause requires:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; . . . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.7'
Rooted in the Supremacy Clause is the Congressional power to preempt an
area of law traditionally governed by the states. 72
73There are two different types of preemption: express and implied.
Express preemption occurs when Congress has spoken directly, excluding
further state action. 74 Implied preemption, on the other hand, occurs when
Congressional intent to Preempt is "implicitly contained in [the statute's]
structure and purpose." Implied preemption is broken down further into
two subcategories: field and conflict. 76 Field preemption occurs when the
regulatory scheme implemented by Congress is "so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to
69. See infra Part.11I.C.
70. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990).
71. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
72. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991).
73. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).
74. Id. (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
75 Gade. 505 U.S. at 98
76. Id.
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supplement it."77  Conflict preemption comes in two different forms:
impossibility and obstacle.78 When it becomes impossible to comply with
both the federal and state laws, the state law is considered preempted.79
Implied preemption occurs when state law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."80
Any claim of preemption starts with analyzing the text of the federal
statute at issue. 81 The text, however, is not viewed in a vacuum. There are
two guiding princiles: the presumption against preemption and
congressional intent. The presumption against preemption assumes that
the "the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."83
There is some debate as to whether the presumption against preemption is
wholly applicable. 84 However, the instances where the Supreme Court has
ignored the presumption have been entirely in the realm of preemption as an
affirmative defense, and not affirmative Rreemption, where the claim of
preemption itself is the sole controversy. 5 There is little debate that in
affirmative preemption matters, a court should start with a strong
presumption against preemption, and even more so in Spending Clause
86
preemption cases.




80. Id. (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
81. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 487 (1997).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assumptions of Federalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1763,
1785 (2006); see generally Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of
Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV. 967 (2002).
85. Compare Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 867 (2000), with Shaw
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983).
86. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 662 (2003).
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The second guiding principle is that "'[t]he purpose of Congress is the
ultimate touchstone' in every pre-emption case.", 7  Thus, "any
understanding of the scope of a pre-emption statute must rest primarily on 'a
fair understanding of congressional purpose. "' Congressional purpose is
gleaned from the "statutory framework," "the structure and purpose of the
statute as a whole" and the court's own understanding of "the way in which
Congress intended the statute and its surrounding regulatory scheme to
affect business, consumers, and the law." 89 Keeping these guidelines in
mind, the analysis then turns to the text of the statute or regulation and the
particular circumstances surrounding the claim.
The Supremacy Clause "is not a source of any federal rights."90 Instead,
"there is an implied right of action to enjoin state or local regulation that is
pre-empted by a federal statutory or constitutional provision." 91 However,
the Supreme Court has never explicitly held that an implied right of action
exists. 2 Rather, the Court has repeatedly decided preemption claims on
their merits, without discussing the authority to bring suit under the
Supremacy Clause. 93  The Court's decisions in Franchise Tax Board v.
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust and Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
both decided the same day, are more instructive to this point. 94 In Franchise
Tax Board, the petitioners asked the court to declare that the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) did not preempt a state law; the
87. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1997).
88. Id. at 485-86 (emphasis added) (citing Cipollene v. Liggest Grp., Inc., 505 U.S.
504, 530 (1992).
89. Id. (citing Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, Ill (1992))
(internal quotations omitted).
90. Golden State Transit Corp. v. L.A., 493 U.S. 103, 107 (1989) (quoting Chapman
v. Hous. Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 613 (1979)).
91. RICHARD H. FALLON, DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART &
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS & THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 903 (5th ed. 2003); see also
David Sloss, Constitutional Remedies for Statutory Violation, 89 IOWA L. REv. 355, 362
(2004).
92. See David Sloss, supra note 90 at 360.
93. See, e.g., Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973); Ray v.
Atl. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978); Gade, 505 U.S. at 88.
94. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1983);
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 85 (1983).
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Court held that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction for such a claim. 95 In
Shaw, the petitioners sought injunctive and declaratory relief, requesting a
ruling that a state law was preempted by ERISA; the Court agreed.9 6 In a
footnote to the Shaw opinion, the Court stated that its decision in Franchise
Tax Board "does not call into question the lower court's jurisdiction to
decide [affirmative preemption] cases."97
Relying on Shaw, the Ninth Circuit recognized that: "A plaintiff who
seeks injunctive relief from state regulation, on the ground that such
regulation is pre-empted by federal statute which, by virtue of the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, must prevail, thus presents a federal
question which the federal courts have jurisdiction." 98 As eluded to in Shaw
and the Ninth Circuit's opinion, actions brought under the Supremacy
Clause provide only for equitable remedies, namely injunctive and
declaratory relief.99 Injunctive relief is an equitable remedy that either
mandates a party take a particular action or prohibits a party from taking a
particular action.100  Preemption claims lend themselves primarily to
prohibitory injunctions; therefore, only prohibitory injunctions will be
discussed. Of the types of injunctions available, two are important to the
Supremacy Clause: preliminary and permanent. A preliminary injunction is
a request that a court prohibit a party from taking a particular action during
the course of litigation,' 0 while a permanent injunction provides for
indefinite prohibition following a trial on the merits. 102 Both preliminary
95. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 9-10.
96. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 109.
97. Id.
98. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 543 F.3d 1050, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2008).
99. Id.; see also Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96 n.14.
100. See Sereboffv. Mid Atl. Med. Serv., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 360 (2006); Rumsfeld v.
Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 51 (2006).
101. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9-10
(1983).
102. Force v. Pierce City R-VI Sch. Dist., 570 F. Supp. 1020, 1031-32 (W.D. Mo.
1983).
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and permanent injunctions should be sought in a claim for affirmative
- 103preemption.
To be entitled to a preliminary injunction a party must establish: (1) a
substantial likelihood that it will prevail on the merits; (2) that it will suffer
irreparable injury unless the injunction issues; (3) that the threatened injury
to the moving party outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction
will cause the opposing party; and (4) that the injunction would not be
adverse to the public interest.104  Permanent injunctions differ in two
regards: first, a permanent injunction may only be issued after a trial on the
merits; and second, permanent injunctions do not re 3uire proof of irreparable
harm, merely proof of an inadequate legal remedy.
Although the four-part test for preliminary injunctions is generally
applicable in each of the federal circuits, there are two schools of thought as
to the weight given to each factor.106 The first approach applies each part of
the test with equal weight; this is often referred to as the "traditional" test.'07
The second test is referred to as the "alternative" or "sliding scale" test.
Under this approach, "a court may grant the injunction if the plaintiff
'demonstrates either a combination of probable success on the merits and the
possibility of irreparable injury or that serious questions are raised and the
balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor." 0  Despite the long-standing
circuit split, the "Supreme Court has not yet articulated a consistent standard
for granting or denying a preliminary injunction."' 09
103. Preliminary injunctions only function until the trial has ended. In cases of
preemption, the intention is to permanently stop the action. A preliminary injunction
should be sought to stop the action as the trial proceeds with a permanent injunction
being the actual final award. Therefore, both should be sought.
104. Lundgrin v. Claytor, 619 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1980).
105. Force, 570 F. Supp. at 1031-32.
106. See Morton Denlow, The Motion for a Preliminary Injunction: Time for a
Uniform Federal Standard, 22 REv. LITIG. 495, 514-30 (2003); but see Winter v. NRDC,
Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 375-76 (2008).
107. See, e.g., Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Guilbert, 934 F.2d 4, 5 (1st Cir. 1991).
108. Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers, 381 F.3d 905, 912 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing
Johnson v. Cal. St. Bd. of Accountancy, 72 F.3d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir. 1995)).
109. Denlow, supra note 106, at 510.
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The second possible remedy is derived from the Declaratory Judgment
Act. The Act provides:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction ... any court
of the United States . . . may declare the rights and other legal
relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether
or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration
shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and
shall be reviewable as such. 110
Relief under the Act is available if there is an actual controversy and the
controversy would allow for "specific relief through a decree of a conclusive
character, as distinguished from an opinion."' This declaration is not a
right, but merely "available as a matter of judicial discretion."I12
Declaratory judgments should not be used as a means of circumventing
administrative or special tribunal decisions.' 1 Finally, courts have long
recognized the potential for declaratory relief in preemption actions.114
Section 1983 claims, alternatively, can result in awards of monetary relief,
such as attorney's fees and punitive damages." 5 As a result, preemption
actions are less attractive than § 1983 claims, especially for Medicaid
beneficiaries whose acceptance in the Medicaid program alone indicates a
lack of finances. For providers, the lack of monetary relief and paying out
of pocket for attomey fees does not diminish the attractiveness of
preemption claims, given the impact of Gonzaga on § 1983.
B. PREEMPTION AND THE MEDICAID A CT: PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH
AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA V. WALSH
Preemption has become an important avenue for Medicaid providers
following Gonzaga. One reason for the Supremacy Clause's prominence is
that it is not a source of any federal right, ostensibly negating a "Gonzaga-
like" analysis. This brings the equal access provision back into play so long
110. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006).
111. Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 746 (1998).
112. Allnet Commc'n Serv., Inc. v. Nat'l Exch. Carrier Ass'n, Inc., 965 F.2d 1118,
1121 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
113. Public Serv. Com. v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 246 (1952).
114. See Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645-46
(2002); Gade v. Nat'1 Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 97 (1992).
115. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56(1983).
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as it has preemptive force. The Medicaid Act contains no general
preemption clause; consequently, there exists no claim of express
preemption." 6 If the Medicaid Act has any preemptive force, it must be
implied. However, any implied field preemption claim is likely to fail for
several reasons. First, the structure of Medicaid as a voluntary cooperative
federal-state program implies that it is not an area where Congress has taken
regulatory control of the entire field. Further, the Medicaid Act leaves wide
discretion to the states, again negating a field preemption claim.' There
have been successful impossibility preemption claims under the Medicaid
Act." Providers, however, would have little to no success making such a
claim under the equal access provision because their participation, like the
states, is purely voluntary.11 9 This leaves only obstacle preemption as a
possible claim.
The Supreme Court, in Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America v. Walsh, a 2003 decision, directly confronted such a claim.120 In
that case, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
("PhRMA") brought suit challenging the constitutionality of Maine's
prescription drug rebate program. 12 PhRMA contended that the Medicaid
Act preempted the state program because it stood as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the Act's full purposes and objectives.122
Specifically, the program subjected Medicaid sales to a "prior authorization"
procedure, which the state implemented without the Secretary's prior
approval and to achieve Medicaid-related goals.123 The district court issued
a preliminary injunction enjoining the State of Maine from implementing the
program.124 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the order,
116. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a.
117. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 303 (1985) (holding that the Medicaid
Act "gives the States substantial discretion . . . as long as care and services are provided
in the best interest of the recipients").
118. Ark. Dep't. of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 269 (2006).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A).
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and PhRMA appealed to the Supreme Court.125 Justice John Paul Stevens,
writing for a plurality of the Court, found that PhRMA failed to adequately
establish a likelihood of success on the merits.' 26 The opinion carried the
day because of one concurring opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer and
Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia's separate opinions concurring
in result only. 27
The seven Justices seemingly reaffirmed two other important factors.
First, the presumption against preemption is applicable. Justice Stevens,
joined by Justices Souter, Ginsberg and Breyer wrote: "[T]he question is
whether there is a probability that Maine's program was pre-empted by the
mere existence of the federal statute. We start therefore with a presumption
that the state statute is valid."l28 The dissent did not sign on to that part of
the decision; however, unlike Part V, the dissent did not take particular issue
with the plurality's analysis.129 Given other similarly situated preemption
cases, it is safe to assume that the presumption against preemption has
force.130
Second, the seven Justices affirmed, albeit sub silento, that the Supremacy
Clause provides an implied right of action. Both the dissent and plurality
discussed the issue of preemption on its merits without ever mentioning
whether a right existed to bring suit.13 1 Only Justices Scalia and Thomas
took issue with the viability of PhRMA's claim.132 These two points aside,
Part V of the plurality opinion inspired the most debate.
125. Id.
126. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 668 (2003). This
holding is found in Part V of the plurality opinion and is joined by only two other
Justices. Id. at 649.
127. Id at 649, 674-75. Outside of Part V, seven other Justices joined portions of the
decision; excluding Justices Thomas and Scalia.
128. Id at 661.
129. Id at 684 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
130. See Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715-718
(1985); see also Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 153 (1944).
131. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 649, 684 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 674-75 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring).
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1. Part V of the Plurality: Justice Breyer's Concurrence and the
Dissent
Part V of the plurality opinion, written by Justice Stevens and joined by
Justices Ginsburg and Souter held that the plaintiff failed to "show that there
was no Medicaid-related goal or purpose served" by state statute. 3 3 The
fact that Maine's statute failed to explicitly state a Medicaid-related goal or
purpose was not by itself adequate proof because the statute on its face
"clearly" served some Medicaid-related goals.' 34 In support of the holding,
Justice Stevens listed three specific Medicaid-related goals "plainly present
in the Maine Rx Program."
The plurality's analysis does not end there. The fact that the program may
serve Medicaid-related goals or purposes does "not provide a sufficient basis
for upholding the program if it severely curtailed Medicaid recipients'
access." 36 In further examination of PhRMA's obstacle preemption claim,
Justice Stevens stated, the "mere fact that prior authorization may impose a
modest impediment to access .. . does not provide a sufficient basis for pre-
emption." 1 There must be evidence "that a significant number of patients'
medical needs . . . will be adversely affected . . . [Additionally,] the impact
on doctors may be significant if it produces an administrative burden that
affects the quality of their treatment of patients." 3 PhRMA, however,
failed to demonstrate such a burden.' 39
The plurality also noted the importance of the Secretary's opinion. Justice
Stevens wrote: "The presumption against federal pre-emption of a state
statute designed to foster public health has special force when it appears,
and the Secretary has not decided to the contrary, that the two governments
are pursing 'common purposes."' 40 As addressed above, the Secretary had
133. Id at 662.
134. Id at 662-63.
135. Id. at 663-64.
136. Id. at 665 (emphasis added).
137. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 667 (2003) (emphasis
added).
138. Id. at 667-68.
139. Id
140. Id. at 666 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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not approved Maine's action, but CMS had sent a letter to all Medicaid
directors on behalf of the Secretary indicating that a program such as
Maine's would be considered a significant component of a state plan.141
Furthermore, CMS had approved at least one similar program.142
Justice Breyer did not sign on with this portion of the opinion. Instead, he
wrote a concurrence with similar force. Justice Breyer opined, "[t]o prevail,
petitioner ultimately must demonstrate that Maine's program would
'seriously compromise important federal interests."' 43 He also noted that
the Secretary's "views are highly relevant to the question . . . ." Justices
Thomas and Scalia - concurring solely in Walsh's outcome - reaffirmed the
authority accorded to the Secretary in the plurality opinion, which
emphasized the importance of the Secretary's views. The dissent, however,
did not discuss any weight it afforded the Secretary's opinions.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist
and Justice Anthony Kennedy, wrote for the dissent. 145 The dissent found
that "a limit on States' authority is inherent in the purpose and structure of
the Medicaid Act."1 46 Justice O'Connor also cited the importance of §
1396a(a)(30):
[A] state plan must "safeguard against unnecessary utilization" of
services and ensure that "payments are consistent with efficiency,
economy, and quality of care." These provisions confirm
Congress' intent that state Medicaid initiatives not burden
Medicaid beneficiaries without serving a Medicaid goal such as
stretching available resources to the greatest effect.147
Thus, Justice O'Connor opposed the plurality's "post-hoc justifications"
that Medicaid goals were served by the state action as such arguments were
never raised by Maine.148 The dissent would have upheld the injunction,
141. Id at 661 n.30.
142. Id at 672 (Breyer, J., concurring).
143. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 671(2003) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
144. Id at 672.
145. Id. at 684.
146. Id. at 685-86.
147. Id. at 686-87 (quoting § 1396a (a)(30)(A)).
148. Id. at 688.
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because the petitioners presented "concrete evidence of the burdens" and
there was "no evidence or argument" that Medicaid-related goals were
served. 149 Although agreeing in part with the plurality's analysis, the dissent
found that the state's action created an obstacle to the accomplishment of the
Medicaid Act's goals and purposes.iso In reaching this conclusion there was
no mention of the Secretary's opinion and what impact, if any, it had on the
dissenting Justices' rationale. As the district court stated on remand, "[t]he
dissenters apparently did not view the role of HHS as central to the
determination of whether the Plan served a Medicaid purpose, believing the
District Court could (and did) properly make that assessment."' 51
2. Separate Concurrences, in Result Only: Justices Scalia and
Thomas
Justices Scalia and Thomas, unlike the other seven Justices, did not reach
the preemption issue on its merits, but in somewhat different fashions, they
both dismissed the claim on procedural grounds. Justice Thomas wrote:
"[t]he Medicaid Act grants States broad discretion to impose prior
authorization and proper consideration of the Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services' role in administering the Medicaid Act
forecloses petitioner's pre-emption claim.,,152 Further, Justice Thomas
asserted that the Secretary "is delegated a type of pre-emptive authority"
because he must approve all state plans.' 53 Accordingly, he would give the
Secretary the highest level of deference- Chevron deference.' 54 A Chevron
analysis, however, would impose "a perhaps-insurmountable barrier to a
claim of obstacle pre-emption."
In his final observation, Justice Thomas cited Gonzaga for the proposition
that the "unambiguously conferred right" standard applied not only to §
149. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 668-90 (2003) (2003).
150. Id.
151. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Nicholas, No. CIVA 00-157-BH, 2005 WL
4677368 at *5 (D. Me. Jan. 27, 2005).
152. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 676.
153. Id. at 679.
154. Id. at 680.
155. Id.at681.
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1983 claims but also to an implied private right of action.'56 In closing, he
stated, "I would give careful consideration to whether Spending Clause
legislation can be enforced by third parties in the absence of a private right
of action."' 57 Justice Thomas's position has been uniformly dismissed by a
majority of the Court, as time and time again the Court has decided issues of
preemption without ever discussing if a right to bring such an action even
exists. Similarly, it has also been dismissed at the circuit court level. 59
For example, in Lankford v. Sherman, a notable Eighth Circuit case, the
court stated: "Preemption claims are analyzed under a different test than §
1983 claims, affording plaintiffs an alternative theory for relief when a state
law conflicts with a federal statute or regulation."l60 Every circuit court that
has since examined this issue has held likewise.' 6'
Finally, Justice Scalia penned a short, two-paragraph concurrence opining
that he "would reject petitioner's statutory claim on the ground that the
remedy for the State's failure to comply . . . [is limited] . . . under the
156. Id. at 683 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring).
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 635
(2002); Gade v. Nat'1 Solid Wastes Mgnt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 88 (1992); Lawrence
Cnty. v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-i. 469 U.S. 256 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 85 (1983); Ray v. Atl. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978);
Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973); Fla. Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
159. See Indep. Living Ctr. v. Shewry, 543 F.3d 1050, 1066 (9th Cir. 2008); Lankford
v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 513 (8th Cir. 2006); Qwest Corp. v. Santa Fe, 380 F.3d 1258,
1266 (10th Cir. 2004); Local Union No. 12004 v. Mass., 377 F.3d 64, 75 (1st Cir.
2004); Ill. Ass'n of Mortg. Brokers v. Office of Banks & Real Estate, 308 F.3d 762, 765
(7th Cir. 2002); St. Thomas-St. John Hotel & Tourism Ass'n v. V.I., 218 F.3d 232, 241
(3d Cir. 2000) (holding that "a state or territorial law can be unenforceable as preempted
by federal law even when the federal law secures no individual substantive rights for the
party arguing preemption"); Westfield v. Welch's, 170 F.3d 116, 124 n. 4 (2d Cir.
1999) (holding that a cause of action under the Supremacy Clause "do[es] not depend on
the existence of a private right of action under the [preempting statute]"); Burgio &
Campofelice, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Labor, 107 F.3d 1000, 1005-07 (2d Cir.
1997); First Nat'1 Bank of E. Ark. v. Taylor, 907 F.2d 775, 776 n. 3 (8th Cir. 1990).
160. Lankford, 451 F.3d at 509.
161. See sources cited supra note 158.
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Medicaid Act."162 Namely, petitioners may seek only the termination of
funding by the Secretary under § 1396c.163 Justice Scalia would dismiss any
preemption claim under the Medicaid Act; and only examine a claim if
petitioners were seeking review of a denial to terminate funding.164 This
analysis holds little weight for several reasons. First, the Secretary's
approval of a State Plan is illustrative of the Secretary's decision to
terminate funding, and second, the Secretary in Walsh had not formally
approved the state's action. Additionally, § 1396c is rarely used and if used
it would serve only to further harm Medicaid providers and beneficiaries. 65
Justice Scalia's approach of limiting petitioner's remedy to termination of
funding would require overruling Wilder, which the Court has explicitly
rejected. This position has also been rejected by the lower courts. In Harris
v. Olszewski, the Sixth Circuit found "that the Federal Government may
withhold federal funds to non-complying States is not inconsistent with
private enforcement." 66 The most apropos argument originated in the Fifth
Circuit, which rejected arguments based on the opinions of both Justices
Scalia and Thomas, stating, "their persuasive force is wasted on the inferior
courts. Rather, they must persuade at least three other Justices."' 67
C. The Circuit Court's Analysis of Preemption and § 1396a(a)(30)
The subsequent circuit court decisions in this arena can be broken down
into two subgroups that fall in line with either the plurality or dissent in
Walsh. The first subgroup involves preemption claims where the Secretary
was given substantial deference. The second subgroup comes solely from
the Ninth Circuit where no discussion of deference is involved and the state
has been required to show that it affirmatively does not conflict with the
Medicaid Act's goals and purposes.
162. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 675 (2003).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396c; see also Lisa E. Key, Private Enforcement of Federal
Funding Conditions under § 1983: The Supreme Court's Failure to Adhere to the
Doctrine ofSeparation ofPowers, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 283, 292-293 (1996) (arguing §
1396c is an ineffective means of securing state compliance).
166. Harris v. Olszewski, 442 F.3d 456, 463 (6th Cir. 2006).
167. Planned Parenthood of Hous. v. Sanchez, 403 F.3d 324, 332 n.34 (5th Cir. 2005).
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1. Chevron-Level Deference and Preemption Decisions
Less than a year following the Supreme Court's decision in PhRMA v.
Walsh, PhRMA raised similar claims in D.C. Circuit. 16 8 In Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America v. Thompson, the Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit held that the Secretary's interpretations when approving
state's Medicaid plan were afforded Chevron-level deference. 69 In doing
so, the court found that the state's actions did not violate the Supremacy
Clause.170 The court relied heavily on Walsh in making its determination,
despite the fact that only Justice Thomas explicitly stated that Chevron was
applicable. 172
The D.C. Circuit laid out the appropriate analysis for determining when an
agency is afforded such deference, stating:
Under the Chevron framework, "[i]f . . . 'Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue,' we must give effect to
Congress's 'unambiguously expressed intent"' but "[i]f 'the statute
is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,' we ask
whether the agency's position rests on a 'permissible construction
of the statute."" 73
PhRMA argued that Chevron deference was not applicable in the
preemption context, and that at best the Secretary's interpretation should
only be afforded Skidmore deference.174  Under Skidmore, the weight
accorded to the Secretary's interpretation "depend[s] upon the thoroughness
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power
168. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Thompson, 362 F.3d 817, 819 (D.C. Cir.
2004).
169. Id. at 821.
170. Id. at 824-25.
171. Id. at 821.
172. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 680 (2003) (Thomas,
J., concurring). Justice Breyer was the only other Justice to cite Chevron; he also cited
Skidmore. Id. at 673 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134 (1944)).
173. Thompson, 362 F.3d at 823.
174. Id. at 819.
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to persuade, if lacking power to control."' The D.C. Circuit disagreed with
this assertion, reasoning that "Congress manifested its intent that the
Secretary's determinations, based on inter retation of the relevant statutory
provisions, should have the force of law."
Without ever laying the ground work for the proper preemption analysis,
the court concluded that under Chevron the "Secretary's statutory
interpretation is permissible." 7 7  After finding a "permissible"
interpretation, the court then considered "whether [the Secretary's] specific
determination that the Initiative serves valid Medicaid goals is 'arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.'"'7 Notwithstanding the minimal amount of evidence presented by the
state, the court found it "sufficient to [show that] the Secretary's
determination of Medicaid-related benefit [was] not arbitrary. "l7 Thus, the
Medicaid Act did not preempt the state's actions. 80 The D.C. Circuit Court
noted that a majority of the Justices in Walsh did not invoke Chevron
"presumably because the Secretary had not reviewed Maine's program and
participated in the case only as amicus curiae."' 8 ' Thompson has been cited
in other circuits as well.
On February 10, 2010, a Minnesota district court ruled on Minnesota
Pharmacists Association v. Pawlenty.182 In Pawlenty, Medicaid providers
sued for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that a Minnesota law
reducing reimbursement rates was preempted by 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(30).183 The court held that any interpretation of the Secretary
175. Skidmore,323 U.S. at 140.
176. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Thompson, 362 F.3d 817, 822 (D.C. Cir.
2004).
177. Id. at 825.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 826.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 825 n.10.
182. Minn. Pharmacists Ass'n v. Pawlenty, 690 F.Supp. 2d 809 (D. Minn. 2010).
183. Id. at 811-12.
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would be afforded Chevron-level deference. 184 Relying on Thompson, the
court stated that "as the D.C. Circuit has ruled, the Secretary's interpretation
of § 1396a is reviewed 'under the familiar and deferential two-part
framework of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council."'18 5 According to the Pawlenty court, the Secretary is afforded
such deference because "Congress 'expressly conferred on the Secretary
authority to review and approve state Medicaid plans as a condition to
disbursing federal Medicaid payments."" 86 The court went on to dismiss
the provider's preliminary injunction motion. 187
2. The Ninth Circuit's Approach
It has long been a rule in the Ninth Circuit that § 1396a(a)(30) contains
procedural requirements, which the state must consider before passing
Medicaid-related legislation. The Ninth Circuit, like the dissent in Walsh,
focuses not on the actions of the Secretary, but on the actions of the state, to
which it did not extend Chevron deference. In Orthopaedic Hospital v.
Belshe, several hospitals sued the director of California's Medicaid program,
known as Medi-Cal, for reducing reimbursement rates to a level that violated
§ 1396a(a)(30).' 89 Although Orthopaedic centered on a § 1983 claim, the
Ninth Circuit's anal Xsis of § 1396a(a)(30) has been subsequently applied in
preemption claims. o The Orthopaedic court held that the state "must
satisfy the reuirement that the payments themselves be consistent with
quality care." 1 I
184. Id. at 826.
185. Id. at 825.
186. Id. at 826 (citing Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Thompson, 362 F.3d 817,
821-22 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).
187. Minn. Pharmacists Ass', 690 F.Supp. 2d at 829.
188. Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491, 1495 (9th Cir. 1997).
189. Id. at 1492.
190. See, e.g., Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572 F.3d 644 (9th
Cir. 2009). A Petition for a Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United
States is pending at the time this Article goes to press.
191. Orthopaedic, 103 F.3d at 1497.
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Further, "Congress intended payments to be flexible within a range;
payments should be no higher than what is required to provide efficient and
economical care, but still high enough to provide for quality care and to
ensure access to services." 92 To set rates without establishing evidence that
the rates are consistent with efficiency, economy, quality of care, and access
would make the rates arbitrary.193 Therefore, the state "must undertake to
determine what it costs an efficient hospital economically to provide quality
care" and the final rates "must ultimately bear a reasonable relationship to
those costs." 94  The state "need not follow a rigid formula," but in
Orthopaedic, the state failed to make any such findings prior to the rate
reduction and thus, the rates failed to meet the burdens of § 1396a(a)(30).195
The analysis set forth in Orthopaedic has recently been applied in obstacle
preemption claims. In Independent Living Center v. Maxwell-Jolly, a group
of health care providers brought suit claiming that a ten percent rate
reduction based solely on budgetary issues created an obstacle to the goals
and purposes of the Medicaid Act. , In its review, the court found that the
state "failed to provide any evidence that the Department had considered the
impact of the ten percent rate reduction on quality and access to care, as
required by § 30(A)."1 9 7 The providers, however, established sufficient
evidence of the burdens the reimbursement rates placed on both them and
the beneficiaries.198 Based on these facts the court found a likelihood of
success on the merits of the preemption claim and granted the providers'
motion for preliminary injunction.' 99
In response to the court's decision in Independent Living Center, the
California legislature adjusted payment rates again, only this time reducing
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1500.
194. Id at 1498.
195. Id.
196. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572 F.3d 644, 649 (9th Cir.
2009).
197. Id. at 650, 652.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 663.
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them by five percent as opposed to ten percent.200 This too spawned several
provider suits claiming that § 1396a(a)(30) preempted the reduction. In
March of 2010, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the application of Orthopaedic
to those cases. In California Pharmacists Association v. Maxwell-Jolly, the
court reiterated that in "setting Medicaid reimbursement rates [the state]
must study the impact of the contemplated rate reduction on the statutory
factors of efficiency, economy, quality of care, and access to care prior
to setting or adjusting payment rates." ' In enacting the five percent rate
reduction, the legislature did not once even mention efficiency, economy,
202
quality of care, and access to care. Instead, the court found that, as with
the ten percent rate reduction, the state based the five percent rate reduction
203
solely on budgetary concerns.
The state argued that the providers failed to establish that the rate
reduction did not further Medicaid-related goals or purposes.204 The court
dismissed this argument stating, "it is fair to assume that a rate that is set
arbitrarily, without reference to the Section 30(A) requirements, is unlikely
to meet the equal access and quality requirements." 205 The court upheld the
injunction.206 Likewise, in Dominguez v. Schwarzenegger, delivered the
same day as Calfornia Pharmacists, the court found that a reduction in
hourly wages of in-home health care providers was also preempted by §
1396a(a)(30).207 Again the court emphasized that the "State should have
studied the impact of its decreased contribution to provider's wages and
benefits prior to passing [the wage reduction legislation]."208
200. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14105.191(b)(2) (2010); see also CAL. ASSEMBLY
BILL No. 1183 (2008); CAL. LEGIS. SERV. CH. 758 (2008).
201. Cal. Pharmacists Ass'n v. Maxwell-Jolly, 596 F.3d 1098, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010).
A Petition for a Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States is pending
at the time this Article goes to press.
202. Id. at 1109.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1113.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1115.
207. Dominguez v. Schwarzenegger, 596 F.3d 1087, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 2010).




A. Chevron or Skidmore?
Since the decision in Walsh, the dissent has lost two of its three members,
leaving only Justice Kennedy. It is likely that the dissent will have very
little sway on future Medicaid preemption claims that reach the Supreme
Court. The opinions penned by the remaining Justices leave us with one
major point of emphasis-the Secretary's opinion is highly relevant. As
detailed above, this concept did not fall on deaf ears. That is, a few lower
courts have gone as far as to apply Chevron-level deference to matters of
preemption. However, the Supreme Court has further reviewed this issue
and decided to the contrary; making the analysis followed by Thompson and
Pawlenty incorrect.
First, Thompson and Pawlenty represent a misinterpretation of the Walsh
decision. Although both claim to be consistent with the plurality decision in
Walsh, their results are more akin to Justice Thomas's opinion, the only
Justice specifically finding Chevron applicable.209 If any other Justice had
thought Chevron should be applied they had the argument before them and
choose not to address it. In fact, Justice Breyer, in opining that some level
of deference should be applied the Secretary's interpretations, cited both
Chevron and Skidmore, 21 indicating that Justice Breyer himself could not
determine with certainty which would apply.
Second, subsequent Supreme Court decisions have determined that the
agency's interpretation as to preemption is only entitled to Skidmore
deference.211 In 2008, the Supreme Court decided Riegel v. Medtronic
Inc.212 The Court noted that if the federal statute at issue is ambiguous and
the agency's position accorded deference, "mere Skidmore deference would
seemingly be at issue."213 Further, in 2009 the Supreme Court stated:
In prior cases, we have given "some weight" to an agency's views
. . . Even in such cases, however, we have not deferred to an
agency's conclusion that state law is pre-empted. Rather, we have
209. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 680-81 (2003)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
210. Id at 672-73 (Breyer, J., concurring).
211. See Wyeth v. Levine 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1201 (2009).
212. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 312 (2008).
213. Id. at 326.
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attended to an agency's explanation of how state law affects the
regulatory scheme. While agencies have no special authority to
pronounce on pre-emption absent delegation by Congress, they do
have a unique understanding of the statutes they administer and an
attendant ability to make informed determinations about how state
requirements may pose an "obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." The
weight we accord the agency's explanation of state law's impact
on the federal scheme depends on its thoroughness, consistency,
and persuasiveness.214
Despite what seems to be the clear intent of the court, indicating that
Skidmore, not Chevron, deference should apply, Pawlenty still found that
Chevron reflected the appropriate test. Perhaps Justice Thomas said it most
succinctly when he opined, "Where an agency is charged with administering
a federal statute as the Secretary is here, Chevron imposes a perhaps-
insurmountable barrier to a claim of obstacle preemption." I There is little
doubt that if other courts follow Thompson, as did Pawlenty, and ignore
recent Supreme Court precedence, Medicaid providers would face an
"insurmountable barrier."
Even further, Justice Thomas's line of analysis in Walsh not only conflicts
with subsequent Supreme Court decisions, but also directly conflicts with
Congressional intent. The opinion of Justice Thomas rests on the powers the
Secretary has over State Plans. However, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2 states, in
pertinent part: "In an action brought to enforce a provision of this chapter,
such provision is not to be deemed unenforceable because of its inclusion in
a section of this chapter requiring a State plan or specifying the required
contents of a State plan." 216 Section 1320a-2 is referred to as the "Suter fix",
as Congress added the provision following the Supreme Court's decision in
Suter v. Artist M. 217 In Suter, the Supreme Court held that a provision
contained in a State Plan is not enforceable under § 1983.218 Congress
reacted with § 1320a-2. Although § 1320a-2 has received much criticism for
214. Wyeth, 129 S.Ct. at 1201 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
215. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 681 (2003) (Thomas,
J., concurring).
216. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2 (2003).
217. Id.
218. Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992).
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being "very poorly drafted,"219 it still indicates Congressional intent that the
State Plans are enforceable and should not be deemed unenforceable solely
because they are required to be included in State Plans. Justice Thomas's
opinion accomplishes just that.
Providers bringing obstacle preemption claims under § 1396a(a)(30)
should argue that interpretations by the Secretary, if any exist, are afforded
only Skidmore deference. To be sure, Chevron-level deference is applicable
under claims against the Secretary for approval or disapproval of a state
plan. However, no such deference should be afforded when determining
whether a state action is preempted by federal law. If the D.C. and Eighth
Circuit's application of Chevron becomes the rule, rather than the exception,
it may spell the end to all provider initiated preemption claims.
B. Who has the Burden ofProduction?
Representing one of the remaining disputes apparent in Walsh, courts
appear uncertain whether the provider or the state bears the burden of
production regarding whether a legislature enacted a statute in furtherance of
a Medicaid-related goal or purpose. The Ninth Circuit's analysis, starting
with Orthopaedic, and its subsequent application in Independent Living
Center, Calfornia Pharmacists Association, and Dominguez is akin to that
of the dissent in Walsh. The Walsh dissent seems to require the state to
demonstrate that its legislature acted in furtherance of Medicaid-related
goals and purposes.220 The lack of such evidence in the face of a
demonstrated burden would warrant a finding of preemption.221 Given those
same circumstances, the Ninth Circuit found a likelihood of success for
providers claiming preemption under § 1396a(a)(30).
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of § 1396a(a)(30) has not received
much acceptance. For example, the Third Circuit, in Rite Aid v. Houstoun,
refused to adopt the Orthopaedic analysis.222 Instead, the court held that
"Section 30(A) requires the state to achieve a certain result but does not
219. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Health Care Rationing in the Courts: A Comparative
Study, 21 HASTINGS INTL. & COMP. L. REV. 639, 698 (1998); see also Brian D. Ledahl,
Congress Overruling the Courts: Legislative Changes to the Scope ofSection 1983, 29
COLUM. J. L. Soc. PROBS. 411, 412, 434 (1996) (considering § 1320a-2 "confusing").
220. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 684 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 690.
222. Rite Aid of Pa. v. Hous., 171 F.3d 842, 851 (3d Cir. 1999).
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impose any particular method or process for getting to that result."223 The
Third Circuit is not alone in this "result" oriented analysis of § 1396a(a)(30).
The Seventh Circuit has held that "[n]othing in the language of §
1396a(a)(30) . . . requires a state to conduct studies in advance of every
modification;" rather, the statute "requires each state to produce a result."2 4
But as the a Ninth Circuit Court explained, "[t]hose courts that have
criticized Orthopaedic 's reasoning have not simply rubber-stamped rate
reductions imposed by state agencies; rather, reviewing courts typically
subject state rate-making to something akin to 'arbitrary and capricious'
review."225
Unlike the D.C. and Eighth Circuit's approach, outlined above, the Third
and Seventh Circuit's analysis of § 1396a(a)(30) might actually be more in
line with the plurality's opinion in Walsh. A "result" oriented analysis
would require some affirmative proof on the plaintiffs part that the state's
actions were not in furtherance of Medicaid's goals and purposes.
Additionally, "result" like evidence may demonstrate more clearly the
obstacle the state's action creates, which presumably would be more likely
to satisfy the plurality's significant and serious obstruction language.
However, the "results" approach creates quite an impediment to provider
appeals; essentially forcing them to wait until they can no longer accept
Medicaid beneficiaries as patients or go out of business. This is similar to
Scalia's approach of limiting providers' remedies only to removal of federal
funding, only instead of the federal government pulling out of Medicaid, it
requires providers to do so.
Despite the spilt at both the circuit level and within the Supreme Court,
providers should assume they have the burden of production. In this regard,
providers should present evidence that the state did not consider economy,
efficiency, quality of care, and equal access of care. Providers, however,
should be prepared to argue and present evidence that the state's action
results in a failure to meet economy, efficiency, quality of care, and equal
access of care. Although the "result" oriented approach as stated above will
cause greater hardships on both providers and beneficiaries, it may be the
only route to success outside of the Ninth Circuit.
Given the lack of precedence of any real value on § 1396a(a)(30),
preemptive force providers raising such claims do so in uncharted territory,
which is nothing new for anyone who has ever litigated in the Medicaid
223. Id. (emphasis added).
224. Methodist Hosps., Inc. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1029-30 (7th Cir. 1996).
225. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572 F.3d 644, 656 (9th Cir.
2009).
152
2010 Preemption or Bust 153
arena. It is clear that providers, for now, can sue for preemption under the
Medicaid Act. But if there is to be any true success on these claims,
providers must press that Skidmore, not Chevron, is the appropriate
framework for an agency's determination concerning preemption. Further,
providers must be prepared to produce evidence not only of the potential
harm, but at least of some quantifiable actual harm. Accomplishing both
items will be crucial to provider success.
The Medicaid Act's preemptive qualities will likely be tested in the
coming year. With further budgetary shortfalls projected and the sun setting
on the ARRA, some, if not most, states will be cutting back their Medicaid
funding. Providers should be prepared, not only to lobby their respective
legislatures, but also to raise claims of preemption. Engaging the courts and
making successful preemption claims will keep states honest and providers
afloat.
